The Utilization of Intermediate Scrutiny in Establishing the Right to Education for Undocumented Alien Children: Plyler v. Doe by Osifchok, Diane I.
Pepperdine Law Review
Volume 10 | Issue 1 Article 5
12-15-1982
The Utilization of Intermediate Scrutiny in
Establishing the Right to Education for
Undocumented Alien Children: Plyler v. Doe
Diane I. Osifchok
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, Education Law Commons,
Immigration Law Commons, and the Juveniles Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized administrator of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
Kevin.Miller3@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Diane I. Osifchok The Utilization of Intermediate Scrutiny in Establishing the Right to Education for Undocumented Alien Children: Plyler v.
Doe, 10 Pepp. L. Rev. 1 (1983)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol10/iss1/5
CASE NOTE
The Utilization of Intermediate Scrutiny in
Establishing the Right to Education for
Undocumented Alien Children: Pyler P. Doe
The recent decision in the case of Plyer v. Doe has seemingly solidified
the use of the intermediate level of scrutiny as a legitimate standard of re-
view. The Supreme Cour4 in its refusal to apply both the harsh level of
strict scrutiny and the often inadequate lower level of a rational basis
standard, sought a mid-level analysis. Thus, the intermediate level of re-
view enabled the Court to hold the Texas statute which denied undocu-
mented alien children a free public education constitutionally infirm.
I. INTRODUCTION
The plight of the Mexican national in the United States has
been disparaging. Living in constant fear, the illegal alien prefers
obscurity and anonymity. He does not travel, he lives in poverty,
and works for substandard wages; many are afraid to send their
children to school. The illegal alien will not be seen picketing or
protesting for improved conditions or acknowledgment of rights.
Yet, he has been cheated at every chance. The American busi-
nessman has been defrauding Mexican nationals since the early
1900's and the American judicial system has deprived them of
their basic rights for just as long. Nevertheless, Mexican nation-
als continue to migrate to this country in record numbers.
In 1975, the illegal alien suffered yet another setback when the
Texas State legislature amended section 21.031 of the Texas Edu-
cation Code.1 The effect of this amendment 2 was the denial of a
1. Section 21.031 provides, in part:
(a) All children who are citizens of the United States or legally admitted
aliens and who are over the age of five years and under the age of 21 years
on the first day of September of any scholastic year shall be entitled to the
benefits of the Available School Fund for that year.
(b) Every child in this state who is a citizen of the United States or a
legally admitted alien and who is over the age of five years and not over
the age of 21 years on the first day of September of the year in which ad-
mission is sought shall be permitted to attend the public free schools of
tuition-free public education to undocumented alien 3 children in
the State of Texas. Although the amended statute was in effect in
1975, the Tyler Independent School District did not begin to en-
force it until 1977.4 In 1977, the school district imposed an annual
tuition fee of $1,000 per non-resident alien5 child and admission
was denied to those who were unable to pay. Most families could
the district in which he resides or in which his parent, guardian, or the
person having lawful control of him resides at the time he applies for ad-
mission.
(c) The board of trustees of any public free school district of this state
shall admit into the public free schools of the district free of tuition all
persons who are either citizens of the United States or legally admitted
aliens and who are over five and not over 21 years of age at the beginning
of the scholastic year if such person or his parent, guardian or person hav-
ing lawful control resides within the school district.
TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.031 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1982).
2. Previously, the code provided:
(a) All children without regard to color over the age of six years and
under the age of 18 years on the first day of September of any scholastic
year shall be entitled to the benefits of the Available School Fund for that
year.
(b) Every child in this state over the age of six years and not over the
age of 21 years on the first day of September of the year in which admis-
sion is sought shall be permitted to attend the public free schools of the
district in which he resides or in which his parent, guardian, or the person
having lawful control of him resides at the time he applies for admission
notwithstanding the fact that he may have been enumerated in the scho-
lastic census of a different district or may have attended school elsewhere
for a part of the year.
(c) The board of trustees of any public free school district of this state
shall admit into the public free schools of the district free of tuition all
persons over six and not over 21 years of age at the beginning of the scho-
lastic year if such person or his parent, guardian or person having lawful
control resides within the school district.
TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.031 (Vernon 1972) (amended 1975).
3. The term "undocumented alien" typically refers to those Mexican nation-
als who are in the United States without proper documentation. The documenta-
tion is required by the Immigration and Nationality Act. 8 U.S.C. § 1101-1503. (1976
& Supp. IV 1980).
4. The Board of Trustees of the Tyler Independent School District adopted
the following policy in July, 1977:
The Tyler Independent School District shall enroll all qualified students
who are citizens of the United States or legally admitted aliens, and who
are residents of this school district, free of tuition charge. Illegal alien
children may enroll and attend schools in the Tyler Independent School
District by payment of the full tuition fee.
Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 572 (E.D. Tex. 1978), affd 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir.
1980), qfl-d, 102 S. Ct. 2382 (1982).
5. An alien is defined as: "[Alny person not a citizen or national of the
United States." 8 U.S.C. § 1102. (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) ("national" is used to de-
scribe persons owing permanent allegiance to state).
An alien may illegally enter the United States in the following ways:
[a] ny alien who (1) enters the United States at any time or place other
than as designated by immigration officers, or (2) eludes examination or
inspection by immigration officers, or, (3) obtains entry to the United
States by a willfully false or mis- leading representation or the willful con-
cealment of a material fact ....
8 U.S.C. § 1325 (1976). See generally Salinas & Torres, The Undocumented Mexican
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not afford the tuition. The average salary of an undocumented
family in Texas is less than $4,000.00 per year,6 therefore, the in-
ability to pay tuition left many children with nothing to do but
"while away the days." 7
In 1977, a group of undocumented Mexican children 8 challenged
section 21.031 of the Texas Code 9 and sought injunctive and de-
claratory relief. The plaintiffs claimed they had been denied
equal protection of the laws and, in addition, that section 21.031
was preempted by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952.10
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas
held that illegal aliens are entitled to equal protection of the laws
and that section 21.031 violated the equal protection clause.1 The
court also found the statute in violation of the supremacy
clause. 12 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit upheld the district court's
Alien: A Legal, Social, and Economic Analysis, 13 Hous. L. REV. 863, 863 n.1
(1976).
6. A recent study revealed that the mean hourly wage for parents of undocu-
mented children is $4.17. This rate, however, is greater than the average hourly
wage for undocumented aliens working in the Houston area, which averages $2.75
per hour. Cardenas & Flores, Socio-Economic and Demographic Characteristics of
Undocumented Mexicans in the Houston Labor Market: A Preliminary Report, at
70 (March 1980) (Coast Legal Foundation, Houston, Tex.).
7. Crewdson, Access to Free bEducation for Illegal Alien Children, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 26, 1980, at § B at 10, col. 3.
8. The children, who are residents of Smith County, Texas, were represented
by "their parents, as next friends." 458 F. Supp. at 571. Fearful that their identi-
ties might be disclosed, the plaintiffs filed the action under fictitious names. Upon
motion, the court ordered the plaintiffs' true identities not to be disclosed. Id. at
572.
9. See supra note 1.
10. 458 F. Supp. at 572. The complaint also alleged charges of denial of due
process and discrimination on the basis of national origin. These causes of action
were dropped before the case went to trial on the merits. Id. at 572 n.4.
11. Id. at 593. The fourteenth amendment provides: "No State
shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
12. U.S. CONST. art. IV, cl. 2. See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356 (1976). De
Canas involved a challenge to a state statute prohibiting the employment of aliens
who were not legal residents of the United States. The Supreme Court held that
the subject matter of the statute was not preempted by federal law, and that states
were free to legislate with respect to aliens in this area. However, the court noted
that "[e I ven when the Constitution does not itself commit exclusive power to reg-
ulate a particular field to the Federal Government, there are situatioris in which
state regulation, although harmonious with federal regulation, must nonetheless
be invalidated under the Supremacy Clause." Id. at 356. See generally Catz &
Lenard, Federal Pre-emption and the "Right" of Undocumented Alien Children to a
Public Education: A Partial Reply, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 909 (1979).
The district court noted that,
injunction, ruling the statute unconstitutional.13 However, the ap-
peals court noted that the district court erred in holding section
21.031 in violation of the supremacy clause.14 The injunction was
upheld solely on equal protection grounds.15
Several suits challenging the constitutionality of section 21.031
were instituted in both federal and state courts during 1978 and
1979.16 In Hernandez v. Houston Independent School District, a
case decided before the ruling in Doe v. Plyler, a Texas State
Court upheld the constitutionality of section 21.031.17 In several
federal cases, however, the provision was deemed to be constitu-
tionally infirm.18 In November, 1979, the Judicial Panel on Mul-
tidistrict Litigation consolidated four remaining claims19 against
state officials to be heard as a single action in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Texas. 20 In this action,
the district court held that section 21.031 violated the equal pro-
[wihile none of these federal laws or policies precisely and expressly
prohibits the state conduct complained of in this case, that is not disposi-
tive of the pre-emption challenge, [f]or when the question is whether a
Federal act overrides a state law, the entire scheme of the statute must, of
course, be considered, and that which needs must be implied is of no less
force than that which is expressed.
458 F. Supp. at 592 (quoting Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912)).
13. 628 F.2d at 461.
14. Id. at 453.
15. Id. at 450.
16. E.g., Certain Named and Unnamed Non-Citizen Children and Their Par-
ents v. Texas, 448 U.S. 1327 (Powell, Circuit Justice 1980) (vacation of circuit
court's stay of injunction which admitted undocumented alien children to Houston
schools); Boe v. Wright, 648 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1981) (affirmed district court's order
which granted preliminary injunctive relief, thus allowing undocumented children
to attend school in Dallas Independent School District); Hernandez v. Houston In-
dep. School Dist., 558 S.W.2d 121 (1977) (affirmed grant of summary judgment
which found § 21.031 not in violation of equal protection clause and denied admis-
sion in the Houston Independent School District to undocumented alien children).
17. 558 S.W.2d at 123. The court held that tuition-free public education was not
a right based solely on physical presence within the state. Id. at 124.
18. See Boe v. Wright, 648 F.2d 432, 434 (5th Cir. 1981) (Reavley, J., and Clark,
J., specially concurring) (section 21.031 meets criteria of rational basis test estab-
lished for equal protection analysis); In re Alien Children Educ. Litig., 501 F. Supp.
544 (S.D. Tex. 1980), injunction stayed, No. 80-1807 (5th Cir. Aug. 12, 1980), rev'd
sub nom.; Certain Named & Unnamed Noncitizen Children & Their Parents v.
Texas, 448 U.S. 1327 (Powell, Circuit Justice, 1980), prob. juris. noted, 452 U.S. 937
(1981), afid, 102 S. Ct. 2382 (1982).
19. Martinez v. Regan, No. H-78-1797 (S.D. Tex. filed Sept. 18, 1978) (Houston
ISD). The following actions involved nondeportable undocumented aliens: Garza
v. Regan, No. H-78-2132 (S.D. Tex. filed Nov. 6, 1978) (Houston ISD); Cardena v.
Meyer, No. H-78-1862 (S.D. Tex. filed Sept. 27, 1978) (Pasadena ISD): Mendoza v.
Clark, No. H-78-1831 (S.D. Tex. filed Sept. 22, 1978) (Goose Creek Consolidated
ISD).
20. In re Alien Children Educ. Litig., 482 F. Supp 326, 330 (J.P.M.D.L. 1979),
aff'd, 501 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Tex. 1980), injunction stayed, No. 80-1807 (5th Cir. Aug.
12, 1980), rev'd sub nom.; Certain Named and Unnamed Noncitizen Children and
Their Parents v. Texas, 448 U.S. 1327 (Powell, Circuit Justice, 1980), aff'd, 102 S. Ct.
2382 (1982).
[Vol. 10: 139, 1982] Plyler v. Doe
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tection clause. 21 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit summarily affirmed
the lower court's decision.22 In 1981, the United States Supreme
Court noted probable jurisdiction and consolidated the Plyler23
case and In Re Alien Children Education Litigation24 for review.
The Supreme Court affirmed the previous decisions, concluding
that section 21.031 violated the equal protection clause by denying
certain children a tuition-free public education. 25
This note examines the historical progress of the Mexican na-
tional's silent fight for equal coexistence in the United States.
Specifically, it analyzes decisions of the judiciary which have af-
fected the status of the illegal alien in our society. The article
also sets forth the progression of the precedent and reasoning uti-
lized by the Supreme Court in its recent decision to afford illegal
aliens quasi-constitutional rights. In conclusion, it addresses the
prospective effect of the ruling in similar areas of the law.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Illegal migration into the United States has increased dramati-
cally.26 This influx has prompted the search for alternative meth-
ods to diminish the flow of undocumented aliens into the United
States. 27 Congress has struggled with the task of regulating mi-
21. In re Alien Children Educ. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 544, 583-84 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
The court also stated that the statute was not preempted by federal law. See U.S.
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
22. While this appeal was pending, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
upheld the district court's ruling in Doe v. Plyler. Shortly thereafter, the Fifth
Circuit summarily affirmed the decision of the Southern District, basing its affirm-
ance on the Plyler decision. 448 U.S. 1327 (Powell, Circuit Justice, 1980).
23. 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980).
24. 448 U.S. 1327 (Powell, Circuit Justice, 1980).
25. 102 S. Ct. 2382 (1982).
26. The number of apprehended deportable aliens increased twenty-fold from
1967 to 1978. UNITED STATES INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON IMMIGRATION POLICY,
STAFF REPORT, DEPARTMENTS OF JUSTICE, LABOR AND STATE 30 (1979). In 1977, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service apprehended 1,033,427 deportable aliens.
SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 96TH CONG., IST SESS., U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW
AND POLCY: 1952-1979, at 71 (Comm. Print 1979). See generally Nafziger, A Policy
Framework for Regulatinq the Flow of Undocumented Mexican Aliens into the
United States, 56 OR. L. REV. 63, 66-68 (1977). The author indicates that statistics
compiled by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) relating to the
number of illegal aliens in the United States, are often misleading and inflated;
"[O]ne might just as well conclude, ironically, then the 'problem' of undocu-
mented aliens has declined proportionately as their numbers have swelled." Id. at
68. See also Salinas & Torres, supra note 5, at 876-81.
27. The Reagan Administration, in an attempt to regulate the flow of illegal
aliens into the United States, has drafted several proposals based on a bipartisan
gration since the 1870's. The result has been a tremendous mass
of legislation which has "aroused the concern of millions and the
passions of substantial minorites." 28
Historically, however, it has been the Mexican immigrant that
the United States has feared the most. The influx of Mexican na-
tionals reached a high point in 1924, when an estimated 89,000
Mexicans crossed the United States border.29 As the public out-
cry heightened, the immigration policy was tightened.30 It was
strictly enforced until World War II when the United States began
experiencing a shortage of manpower. The immigration policy
has alternately been strictly enforced and then relaxed during the
past century, depending upon domestic conditions such as the la-
bor force, the economy, and public opinion.31
Although immigration policy has often fluctuated, it has never
been a meaningful deterrent to incoming Mexican nationals. Con-
gress is vested with the exclusive power to establish strict immi-
gration quotas,32 but has been unable to effectively enforce those
quotas. 33 Once an undocumented alien enters the United States,
minimum effort, if any, is expended to apprehend him. In es-
sence, a "de facto amnesty prevails." 34 The current trend in im-
select committee study. The committee, initially commissioned in 1977 by the
Carter Administration, seeks to stem the tide of undocumented aliens by imposing
fines upon employers who knowingly hire undocumented aliens. Both the House
Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees and International Law and the
Senate Judiciary Committee on Immigration and Refugee Policy have conducted
hearings since September, 1981, on the proposals concerning a new national immi-
gration policy. See September Hearings Set By House, Senate Panels on U.S. Immi-
gration Policy, 39 Cong. Q. 1445 (1981) [hereinafter cited as September Hearings].
See also Select Commission on Immigration & Refugee Policy, Final Report on
U.S. Immigration Policy & the National Interest, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) [here-
inafter cited as Final Report]; Select Commission on Immigration & Refugee Pol-
icy, U.S. Immigration Policy and the National Interest (1981) (Supp. to Final
Report, supra).
28. Higham, The Politics of Immigration Restriction, 1 IMMIGRATION AND NA-
TIONALrrY L..REv. 1, 1 (1976).
29. Id. at 29.
30. Various groups were strongly opposed to the increase in Mexican immigra-
tion. The small farmers of the Southwest were being undercut by the advantage
of cheap labor to the big cotton farmers. Racial prejudices became more obvious
and vindictive. See Salinas & Torres, supra note 5, at 868. The authors articulate
the "push-pull" theory of immigration. The "push" motivates the Mexican nation-
als to move north because of unemployment and food shortages at home. The
"pull" comes from the United States and includes the state's need for cheap labor
and the inducement of higher wages.
31. See generally Petersen, The "Scientific Basis of Our Immigration Policy,
Commentary XX at 84 (1955).
32. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1153 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
33. 628 F.2d at 451.
34. Hull, Undocumented Aliens and the Equal Protection Clause: An Analysis
of Doe v. Plyler, 48 BROOKLYN L. REV. 43, 48 (1981) (quoting In re Alien Children
Educ. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 544, 549 (S.D. Tex. 1980)).
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migration policy is reflected in a recently proposed federal law
that extends amnesty to a great percentage of undocumented
aliens presently in the United States.35
Congress' unwillingness or inability to control illegal migration
has developed into an apathetic treatment of immigration laws.
This has resulted in creating a greater dilemma, which is a stag-
gering disregard for other American laws. Undocumented aliens
are afraid to report crimes, testify in court, report serious illness,
and contact any type of governmental figure when the need
arises.36 They are fearful of protecting their most basic rights, be-
lieving such action may subject them to subsequent deportation.
Consequently, the rights of illegal aliens in the United States
have not been firmly established by the courts or the legislature,
nor have the rights been asserted by the alien himself.37
Developments in case law have reflected a contradictory ap-
proach toward the illegal alien by the judiciary. Some courts have
treated the undocumented alien as an outlaw. The so-called "out-
law theory" treats the alien's physical presence within the United
States as violating immigration laws, which in turn, justifies the
forfeiture of unrelated legal rights. 38 Other courts have treated il-
legal aliens as persons within the law, entitling them to basic civil
rights.39 The majority currently recognizes that all persons are
entitled to basic civil rights, particularly in the area of due pro-
35. See September Hearings, supra note 28 and accompanying text.
36. Final Report, supra note 28, at 41-42, 73. See also Ortega, The Plight of the
Mexican Wetback, 58 A.B.A.J. 251, 251 (1972).
37. Approximately one million Mexican "wetbacks" live in the United
States. They live in fear and without rights of any kind because they are
in this country illegally. They enter the country without papers and thus
lack legal status, but this should not deny them basic human rights. We
cannot ignore their plight.
Ortega, supra note 37, at 251.
The problems of the illegal alien are analogous to those of the Negro. They face
the same prejudices in finding housing, jobs, places to eat, and public accomoda-
tions. However, the illegal alien is in a more precarious position. He is unable to
speak English and rarely seeks help from governmental agencies. Id. at 253.
38. The unauthorized presence of an alien in the United States is not a crime
under the Immigration and Nationality Act. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1557 (1976 & Supp. IV
1980).
39. Favorable decisions by certain courts regarding the civil rights of undocu-
mented aliens do not refer to those areas affecting violation of immigration law.
See Coules v. Pharris, 212 Wis. 558, 250 N.W. 404 (1933) (Wisconsin Supreme Court
denied legal assistance in attempted recovery of wages earned by illegal alien);
Janusis v. Long, 284 Mass. 403, 188 N.E. 228, 230 (1933) ("[a] person does not be-
come an outlaw and lose all rights by doing an illegal act.") (quoting National
Bank & Loan Co. v. Petrie, 189 U.S. 423, 425 (1902)).
cess and the right of access to the civil courts. However, the "out-
law theory" still remains in effect with regard to other areas of the
law.40
The trend within the Supreme Court has been to follow the ba-
sic policy set forth in the lower courts. The Supreme Court, how-
ever, has been more inclined to afford illegal aliens a greater
number of rights, albiet those of constitutional dimension. The
Court relies on the maintenance of satisfactory international rela-
tions as one of its strongest justifications for this recent trend.41
Yet, illegal aliens still do not receive the benefits provided to
United States citizens. Benefits such as welfare, unemployment
compensation, insurance coverage, and social security are among
those denied to aliens because of their illegal status. A recent
study revealed that high percentages of illegal aliens were subsi-
dizing benefit programs which they could rarely utilize.42 Until
the recent Supreme Court decision of Plyler v. Doe, illegal aliens
had made little progress in achieving any degree of equality with
bona fide United States citizens.
40. See Alonso v. California, 50 Cal. App. 3d 242, 123 Cal. Rptr. 536 (1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 903 (1976) (illegal alien has no right to equal opportunity and may
be denied unemployment benefits); Pinilla v. Bd. of Review, 155 N.J. Super. 307,
382 A.2d 921 (1978) (denied unemployment compensation pending proof of legal
status).
41. The Supreme Court warned the states that international relations could
suffer if each state were allowed to make "repeated interceptions and interroga-
tions" of aliens in the United States. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66 (1941).
The court stated:
One of the most important and delicate of all international relation-
ships, recognized immemorially as a responsibility of government, has to
do with the protection of the just rights of a country's own nationals when
these nationals are in another country. Experience has shown that inter-
national controversies of the gravest moment, sometimes even leading to
war, may arise from real or imagined wrongs to another's subjects, in-
flicted, or permitted, by a government.
Id. at 64.
42. The study found the following percentages of undocumented aliens con-
tributing to governmental programs:
Social Security Taxes Withheld 77.3%
Federal Income Tax Withheld 73.2%
Hospitalization Payments Withheld 44.0%
Filed U.S. Income Tax Returns 31.5%
The following is a list of programs from which illegal aliens benefited:
Hospitals or clinics 27.4%
Collected one or more weeks of 3.9%
unemployment insurance
Have children in U.S. schools 3.7%
Participated in U.S. funded 1.4%
job training programs
Secured food stamps 1.3%
Secured welfare payments 0.5%
NORTH & HOUSTON, THE CHARAcTERIsTIcs AND ROLE OF ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE
UNITED STATEs LABOR MARKET. AN EXPLORATORY STUDY 143.
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III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The states most affected by the surge of illegal aliens are those
bordering Mexico. The legislatures of these states are constantly
devising new methods aimed at restricting the flow of illegal mi-
gration across their borders. In May 1975, the Texas State legisla-
ture enacted one of these alternative methods 43 by amending the
state's education code, in an attempt to reduce expenditures for
public education in the state. The predictable result of this deci-
sion was to place undocumented alien children at a severe social,
emotional, and economic disadvantage, possibly for the rest of
their lives.44
The first suit challenging the constitutional validity of section
21.031 was Doe v. Plyler, a class action filed in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, in September
1977.45 The district court granted a preliminary injunction en-
joining the Tyler Independent School District 46 from restricting
43. The legislature amended § 21.031 of the Texas Education Code which, in ef-
fect, denied undocumented alien children a free public education in the State of
Texas. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.031 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1982). See supra note
1 (text of amended statute). Cf. supra note 2 (text of original statute).
44. Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great ex-
penditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the impor-
tance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the
performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the
armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in prepar-
ing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust nor-
mally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity
of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to
provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.
Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, The Equal Protection Clause, And the Three Faces
of Constitutional Equality, 61 VA. L. REV. 945, 977 n.161 (1975) (quoting Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)). See also Plyler v. Doe, 102 S. Ct. 2382,
2411 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (Chief Justice Burger strongly acknowledged
the importance of education).
45. 458 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Tex. 1978). The suit was filed "on behalf of certain
school-age children of Mexican origin residing in Smith County, Texas, who could
not establish that they had been legally admitted into the United States." 102 S.
Ct. at 2389 (1982). The Tyler School District defined a legally admitted alien as
"one who has documentation that he or she is legally in the United States, or a
person who is in the process of securing documentation from the United States
Immigration Service, and the Service will state that the person is being processed
and will be admitted with proper documentation." Id. at 2389 n.2 (quoting App. to
Juris. Statement in No. 80-1538, at p. 38).
46. The named defendants were the superintendent and the members of the
the admission of the plaintiff children to the schools.47 Upon con-
sidering the plaintiffs' motion for permanent injunctive relief, the
court found that neither section 21.031 nor the school district's im-
plementation policy of section 21.031 had resulted in restricting
the flow of undocumented aliens into Texas.48 The court noted,
however, that increases in the undocumented alien population 49
posed several problems for the school districts in the state.50 The
court found that section 21.031 would exclude a significant
number of students from the school districts,51 thereby resulting
in "economies at some level."5 2 These savings, however, would
Board of Trustees of the Tyler Independent School District. The State of Texas
intervened as a party defendant. 458 F. Supp. at 572.
47. Id. Following evidence in support of the plaintiffs' equal protection claim
and upon a showing that plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm absent interim
relief, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction.
48. Id. at 575. The Assistant Attorney General for the State of Texas
presented the state's reasons and goals underlying the amendment of § 21.031. Es-
sentially, § 21.031 was designed as a financial measure to reduce state funding to
the school system. Secondly, it was implemented in an attempt to restrict the flow
of illegal aliens into the State of Texas and thus, into their school districts. The
legislature found that the increase in migration of Mexican nationals into Texas
was creating an adverse "impact on the educational system . . . to the detriment
of the citizens. . . ." Record of the Proceedings at 163, Dec. 12, 16, 1977 ("Tr.
12/12"). 458 F. Supp. at 573.
49. One recent study indicated that more than four million immigrants and
refugees have entered the United States in the last ten years. The estimated
number of illegal aliens is nearly double that figure. Yet, the exact number of un-
documented aliens within the United States is unknown. The Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) no longer estimates the number. Crewdson, New Ad-
ministration and Congress Face Major Immigration Decisions, N.Y. Times, Dec.
28, 1980, at 1, col. 1. See Final Report, supra note 28, at 36. In 1979, the INS Com-
missioner estimated the undocumented population at between three and six mil-
lion. See generally Fogel, Illegal Aliens: Economic Aspects and Public Policy
Alternatives, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 63 (1977). The author compared the general
rate of population growth with the growth of illegal immigration. He estimates
that the rate of legal immigration is approximately 400,000 annually, and the rate
for illegal immigration is probably the same. Fogel postulates that if the U.S. pop-
ulation stops growing, illegal aliens may account for 3/4 of the future increase in
the population. See also United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 899 n.1 (1975) (Burger,
C.J., concurring) ("[T]he Court today recognizes that as many as 12 million illegal
aliens are now present in this country"). But see Final Report, supra note 28, at
35-36. (influx of undocumented aliens is problem of national scope, not restricted
solely to Mexican nationals).
50. The vast influx of Mexican nationals has created fiscal as well as academic
problems for the school system, attributable to the special educational needs of
the Mexican immigrant. 458 F. Supp. at 576. See also id. at 577 (federal goverment
pays 45% of cost of bilingual education; states pay only 20% of remainder).
51. The Dallas Independent School District projected that 2,000 to 5,000 un-
documented alien children would enroll in their district, in addition to the 120,000
total student enrollment. Boe v. Wright, 648 F.2d 432, 437 & n.7 (5th Cir. 1981)
(Reavely and Clark, J.J., concurring). Cf. In re Alien Children Educ. Litig., 501 F.
Supp. at 578-79 & n.83 (3.7% of undocumented aliens have children attending
school).
52. 458 F. Supp. at 576. The amount of funding granted to the school districts
by the state and federal governments is based on a per student assessment. The
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not necessarily improve the quality of education as the state con-
tended.53 It was also found that section 21.031 affected a small
sub-class of illegal aliens, primarily those migrants who came to
the United States with their families. 54 Noting that the statute
completely deprives the illegal alien children of an education if
tuition is not paid, the court stated, "the illegal alien of today may
well be the legal alien of tomorrow." 55 These uneducated children
"[a]lready disadvantaged as a result of poverty, lack of English-
speaking ability, and undeniable racial prejudices . . . will be-
come permanently locked into the lowest socio-economic class." 5 6
On September 14, 1978, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Texas held that illegal aliens were entitled to
due process and equal protection, provided they were physically
within the United States and subject to its laws. The Court con-
cluded that section 21.031 violated the equal protection clause and
the supremacy clause.57 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit upheld the decision, 58 but found the lower court
had erred in holding section 21.031 violated the supremacy
clause.59
Various other suits which challenged the constitutionality of
state would realize savings upon a decrease in student enrollment. Id. at 577. See
also 102 S. Ct. at 2412-13 & n.10 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (discussing state's
ability to protect its economy and channel saved revenue into other governmental
services).
53. The district court found that the nexus between the "economy measure" of
excluding certain students' enrollment in the school district and the desired goal,
"increasing educational quality for the remaining students," was "unreliable and
often perverse in operation." 458 F. Supp. at 577. See also supra notes 23 & 24.
54. 458 F. Supp. at 578. See also In re Alien Children Educ. Litig., 501 F. Supp.
at 578 n.83 (free public education is not "significant attraction" for undocumented
aliens coming into the United States).
55. 458 F. Supp. at 577.
56. Id. See generally Wilkinson, supra note 45, at 976-1017.
57. 458 F. Supp. at 590-93.
58. 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980).
59. The district court ruled that § 21.031 interfered with an area preempted by
federal law. 458 F. Supp. at 592. The court's rationale was based more on humane
grounds than on legal grounds. Describing the federal immigration policy as one
designed to deal with the problem of illegal entry a the source, the court found
§ 21.031 to be inhumane, as it allowed illegal aliens to establish roots in the United
States and then subjected them to second-class citizenship. Fearing § 21.031 as a
policy which promoted second-class citizenship, the court found it inconsistent
with, and therefore preempted by, federal immigration law policy. Id. Accord De
Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976) (Constitution affords federal government exclu-
sive power to make "uniform Rule of Naturalization" and by extension, exclusive
power to regulate immigration); see, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S.
the Texas statute were filed in the United States District Courts
for the Southern, Western, and Northern Districts of Texas during
1978 and 1979.60 Upon the state's motion,6 1 these claims were con-
solidated and heard as a single action in the District Court for the
Southern District of Texas. 62 That court ruled that section 21.031
violated the equal protection clause stating that "absolute depri-
vation of education" required the use of "strict judicial scrutiny,"
especially when "the absolute deprivation is the result of com-
plete inability to pay. .. ,"63 The district court made the follow-
ing determinations: (1) the state's economic concerns were not a
compelling state interest;64 (2) there was no evidence to support
the contention that exclusion of illegal alien children from the
school district would improve the quality of education; 65 and (3)
both groups of children, those illegal aliens statutorily excluded 66
and those resident children not excluded, had the same basic ed-
ucational needs.67 In conclusion, the court reasoned that "§ 21.031
698 (1893); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1875) (federal policy, being supreme
law of land, preempts any state law that conflicts or interferes with its domain).
The court of appeals concluded that there was neither an express nor implied
intent by Congress to rule that programs denying illegal aliens access to public ed-
ucation are preempted by the federal government. The court further noted that
the conflicts perceived by the district court were "illusory," and § 21.031 does not
conflict with federal policy. 628 F.2d at 453.
60. See supra note 16.
61. The State of Texas, in addition to the Texas Education Agency and local
officials, was named as a defendant in each suit. 102 S. Ct. at 2391.
62. In re Alien Children Educ. Litig., 482 F. Supp. 326 (J.P.M.D.L. 1979), aO d,
501 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Tex. 1980), injunction stayed, No. 80-1807 (5th Cir. Aug. 12,
1980), rev'd sub nom. Certain Named and Unnamed Noncitizen Children and Their
Parents v. Texas, 448 U.S. 1327 (Powell, Circuit Justice, 1980), aff'd, 102 S. Ct. 2382
(1982).
63. 501 F. Supp. at 582. See also infra note 83 (elements of strict scrutiny).
64. 501 F. Supp. at 582. 'he... Equal Protection Clause... measure[s] the
validity of classifications created by state laws." San Antonio Indep. School Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 59 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring). When strict scrutiny is
triggered, the state must prove that the statute is tailored to further a compelling
state interest, and that it has adopted the least drastic alternative. See In re Grif-
flths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Dunn
v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342 (1972); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374-75
(1971); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969). See generally Levinson, The
Right to a Minimally Adequate Education for Learning Disabled Children, 12 VAL.
U.L. REv. 253 (1978).
65. 501 F. Supp. at 583. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 24 n.56, 42-43 & n.86, 46 n.101 (1973) (no direct correlation between amount
expended per student and quality of education received).
66. The children not 'legally admitted' are those without documents. It is
important to note that this is not equivalent to deportable. Many of the
undocumented children are not deportable. None of the named plaintiffs
is under an order of deportation. Immigration experts testified that it is
most unusual for the Immigration and Naturalization Service to initiate
deportation proceedings against children.
501 F. Supp. at 583 n.103.
67. Id. at 583. Cf. Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. at 589 (educational needs of those
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was not carefully tailored to advance the asserted state interest in
an acceptable manner."68 Pending an appeal of this decision, the
Fifth Circuit ruled section 21.031 was constitutionally infirm, up-
holding the district court decision in Doe v. Plyler. 69 Based on the
Plyler decision,70 the Fifth Circuit summarily affirmed the ruling
of the Southern District in the appeal of In re Alien Children Edu-
cation Litigation.7 1 Noting probable jurisdiction,72 the United
States Supreme Court consolidated both cases and rendered its
decision on June 15, 1982. The Supreme Court held the Texas
statute was in violation of the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment.73
IV. EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court was faced with an issue of first impression
in determining whether the equal protection clause applies to ille-
gal aliens.7 4 The Fifth Circuit was the first court to unequivocally
hold that illegal aliens were entitled to equal protection guaran-
excluded by § 21.031 are for most part no different than needs of children legally
attending schools).
68. 102 S. Ct. 2382, 2391 (1982) (quoting In re Alien Children Educ. Litig., 501 F.
Supp. at 583-84.
69. 628 F.2d at 461.
70. Both district courts held § 21.031 unconstitutional. Their decisions, how-
ever, were based on different reasons. The Eastern District Court held the statute
unconstitutional because they found the state's enactment of it was not rationally
related to the state's asserted goals. The Southern District Court concluded that
§ 21.031 violated the equal protection clause after subjecting it to a strict judicial
scrutiny test. The Southern District Court also noted that the statute impaired a
previously unrecognized fundamental right, that of access to free public education.
501 F. Supp. at 564.
71. 448 U.S. 1327 (Powell, Circuit Justice, 1980).
72. 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980), prob. juris. noted, 451 U.S. 968 (1981), affd, 102
S. Ct. 2382 (1982) and 448 U.S. 1327 (Powell, Circuit Justice, 1980), prob. juris.
noted, 452 U.S. 937 (1981), affd, 102 S. Ct. 2382 (1982).
73. 102 S. Ct. 2382 (1982). The Supreme Court did not address the preemption
issue which was presented by Appellees in both cases. The Court reasoned that,
"[i] n light of our disposition of the Fourteenth Amendment issue, we have no oc-
casion to reach this claim." Id. at 2391 n.8.
74. Historically, the rights of illegal aliens have not been clearly defined. Due
to the reluctance of illegal aliens to challenge improprieties, the courts have rarely
taken a stance with regard to their status in the United States. A recent study
concluded that "[u I ndocumented persons are in the extremely precarious position
of being unable to assert themselves without subjecting themselves to possible de-
portation or prosecution." A Report of the Texas Advisory Committee to the
United States Committee on Civil Rights, Sin Papales: The Undocumented In
Texas, at 32 (Jan. 1980). See also supra notes 31, 38 & 40.
tees. 75 These guarantees, set forth in the fourteenth amendment,
provide, "[N]o State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty or
property without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."76 The
conflicts confronting the courts in the illegal alien education cases
originate from this clause. Issues involving illegal aliens that
were considered by the Supreme Court include: whether illegal
aliens are within a state's jurisdiction for purposes of constitu-
tional protection, and if so, to what extent is protection afforded
these non-citizens? An important decision deeply affecting the fu-
ture rights and privileges of illegal aliens was reached on June 15,
1982, when the United States Supreme Court granted undocu-
mented alien children the right to a tuition-free public education.
This decision has, in effect, placed illegal aliens on an equal level
with all American children striving for an education.
The Supreme Court held that illegal aliens are "within the juris-
diction" of a state when they are physically within its borders,
thus entitling them to equal protection guarantees. The Court
then addressed the issue of whether section 21.031 violated the
equal protection clause. Concluding that "all persons similarly
circumstanced shall be treated alike," 77 the Supreme Court found
the Texas statute unconstitutional. However, the Court deviated
from some of the basic reasoning used to substantiate the lower
courts' decisions.7 8 For example, the Supreme Court did not ac-
cept appellees' contentions that education is a fundamental
right79 implicitly embodied in the Constitution.8 0 The Court also
rejected the argument that the undocumented aliens were a sus-
75. The Fifth Circuit held that § 21.031 violated the equal protection clause in
denying undocumented alien children a free public education. 628 F.2d at 450.
76. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
77. 102 S. Ct. at 2394 (quoting F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412,
415 (1920)).
78. 501 F. Supp. at 556-58. The district court classified the plaintiffs as a sus-
pect class. See also supra note 20 and accompanying text.
In Plyler, the Fifth Circuit refused to classify the plaintiffs as a suspect class and
did not explicitly hold education as a fundamental right. However, in the majority
opinion, Judge Johnson implied an unwillingness to abandon the fundamental in-
terest branch of a strict judicial scrutiny standard of review. 628 F.2d at 457. ("We
decline to find that complete denial of free education to some children is not a de-
nial of fundamental right").
79. The Supreme Court has previously held fundamental rights to include:
the right to interstate travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); the right to
vote, Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); the right to free exer-
cise of religion, Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); the right to freedom of as-
sociation, Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); and the right to a
criminal appeal, Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
80. "Public education is not a 'right' granted to individuals by the Constitu-
tion." 102 S. Ct. at 2397. See also San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
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pect class.8 1 The Court did not utilize the strict judicial scrutiny
analysis8 2 in determining the validity of section 21.031, but rather,
the statute was analyzed according to an intermediate standard of
review.8 3 Intermediate or middle tier review is a less stringent
standard used to determine whether certain legislation has a sub-
stantial relationship to the state interest advanced. 84 The Court
concluded that section 21.031 did not efficiently further a substan-
tial state goal, and was therefore unconstitutional.8 5
A. The Illegal Alien As a "Person"
In order to invoke constitutional guarantees, it must first be es-
tablished that those who seek protection are warranted in so do-
ing. In recent years, the Supreme Court has expanded its
interpretation of the equal protection clause and the fourteenth
amendment. This resulted in a broadening of the category of
groups protected by the equal protection clause.8 6 The Supreme
Court interpreted "within its jurisdiction" as a geographic or terri-
torial qualification, not solely limited to those persons or citizens
who are legally within the states' boundaries.87 The Court has
also ruled that aliens, even those within the country illegally, are
"persons" recognized by the Constitution, thereby enabling them
to invoke guarantees provided in the fifth and fourteenth
81. 102 S. Ct. at 2398. But see id. at 2404 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (providing
education to some and denying it to others automatically "creates class distinc-
tions").
A "suspect class" is defined as a "discrete and insular minority whose members
possess some immutable characteristic determined by birth alone and who by vir-
tue of this characteristic suffer some special disability." Comment, Recent Deci-
sions: Undocumented Aliens-Equal Protection and the Right to a Free Public
Education: Doe v. Plyler, 33 ALA. L. REV. 181, 188 (1981) (footnote ommited); see
also United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
82. The strict scrutiny test is used to determine if a state statute threatens a
fundamental right or affects a suspect class. See generally Wilkinson, supra note
45. See, e.g., Rosber, Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Right to Vote?, 75
MICH. L. REV. 1092 (1977), reprinted in 2 IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY L. REV. 79,
at 91-96 (1978-1979).
83. See infra note 98 and accompanying text (intermediate standard of review
analysis).
84. Cf. infra note 95 (elements of rational basis standard).
85. 102 S. Ct. at 2402.
86. See generally Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and
Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1026-28 (1979).
87. "Every citizen or subject of another country, while domiciled here, is
within the allegiance and the protection, and consequently within the jurisdiction
of the United States." 102 S. Ct. at 2392 n.10 (emphasis added) (quoting United
States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 693 (1898)).
amendments.8 8 9
The appellants continued to utilize the "outlaw theory" in Doe
v. Plyler. They argued that persons are not "within the jurisdic-
tion" of a state if they are there illegally. An analysis of the origi-
nal meaning attached to the phrase, "within its jurisdiction," and
the policy behind the enactment of the fourteenth amendment
contravenes the appellants' contention. The congressional debate
of the equal protection clause revealed, "the phrase 'within its ju-
risdiction'... was intended in a broad sense to offer the guaran-
tee of equal protection to all within a State's boundaries, and to
all upon whom the State would impose the obligations of its
laws." 90 Thus, the meaning of the phrase is reciprocal in nature;
anyone subjected to the state's laws is also protected by them.
The ruling, agreed upon by both factions of the Court,9 1 defined
illegal aliens as "persons within the jurisdiction" of the State of
Texas and thus entitled to invoke the equal protection guarantees
of the fourteenth amendment. 92
B. Equal Protection: Standards of Evaluation
For purposes of evaluating state legislation, the equal protec-
tion doctrine concerns itself with the nature of the discrimination
and the nature of the burdens or benefits involved.93 Thus, the
statute in question is classified to determine the standard of re-
view to be utilized in evaluating its validity under the Constitu-
tion. Normally, application of the equal protection clause to state
action only requires that the state legislation bear some reason-
88. 102 S. Ct. at 2391-92; See also Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953) (il-
legal alien is "person" in ordinary sense of term); United States v. Wong Kim Ark,
169 U.S. 649 (1898) (defined "jurisdiction" as used in geographical sense); Wong
Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (Court held illegal aliens entitled to
protection of due process clause and implied they are also within fourteenth
amendment's protection); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (provisions con-
tained in equal protection clause are "universal in their application, to all persons
within the territorial jurisdiction." Id. at 369).
89. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1033-34 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Bing-
ham in support of fourteenth amendment as originally written). "I submit to the
judgment of the House, that it is impossible for mortal man to frame a formula of
words more obligatory than those already in that instrument, enjoining this great
duty upon the several states and on several officers of every State in the Union."
Id.
90. 102 S. Ct. at 2393.
91. "I have no quarrel with the conclusion that the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment applies to aliens who, after their illegal entry into this
country, are indeed physically 'within the jurisdiction' of a State." 102 S. Ct. at 2409
(Burger, C.J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 2392-93.
93. See generally, Gunther, Foreward. In Search of Evolving Doctrine On A
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 12-24
(1972) (theory of policy underlying equal protection doctrine).
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able relationship to a legitimate state interest.94 Although the
equal protection clause was designed as a restriction on state ac-
tion inconsistent with constitutional guarantees, a more stringent
test would not be applied unless a "suspect class" or "fundamen-
tal right" were involved. If state legislation threatens a "suspect
class" or impinges upon a "fundamental right," strict judicial
scrutiny would require the state to prove that the legislation in
question had been "precisely tailored to serve a compelling gov-
ernmental interest."95
The Court has recently developed a third level of review. 96 The
"intermediate" or "middle tier" standard of review is used only in
the limited situation where the legislation cannot be classified as
"facially invidious" yet, it affects too valuable a right to be evalu-
ated by the rational basis standard.97 This level of evaluation con-
centrates on the effects the legislation will have with regard to
well established constitutional principles. In effect, it is the pro-
tection of important values which stem from the Constitution, al-
though not explicitly provided for in the document. The
94. The rational basis standard of review is utilized only when determining
the constitutionality of state action that does not involve a "suspect class" or fun-
damental constitutional right. The statute is presumed constitutional unless it can
be shown that the state had no rational basis for implementing it or unless it can
be shown that its implementation does not justify the state's desired goal. See
Levin, The Courts, Congress, And Educational Adequacy: The Equal Protection
Predicament, 39 MD. L. REV. 187, 191-94 (1979); See also supra note 82 (definition of
"suspect class"), and supra note 80 (fundamental rights provided by the
Constitution).
95. 102 S. Ct. at 2394-95. See also supra note 65.
96. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (Supreme Court utilized "middle
tier" analysis in evaluating constitutionality of Oklahoma statute forbidding sale
of beer based on age and gender); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (intermediate
standard of review used in ruling New York statute constitutional); University of
Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (discussing court's role in evaluating
state action). But see Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976) (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting). Justice Blackmun, commenting on the intermediate standard of review
stated, "[t]hese matters of practical judgment and empirical calculation are for
[the state] .... In the end, the precise accuracy of [the state's] calculations is
not a matter of specialized judicial competence; and we have no basis to question
their detail beyond the evident consistency and substantiality." 427 U.S. at 515-16.
97. The Court, clarifying its position on the use of an intermediate standard of
review stated, "[i]n expounding the Constitution, the Court's role is to discern
'principles sufficiently absolute to give them roots throughout the community and
continuity over significant periods of time, and to lift them above the level of the
pragmatic political judgments of a particular time and place.'" 102 S.Ct. at 2395
n.16 (quoting University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978) (Opinion
of Powell, J.) (quoting A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT 114 (1976)).
intermediate level of review seeks assurances that the state ac-
tion furthers a substantial interest of the state.
Evaluation of the constitutionality of a particular piece of legis-
lation mandates the use of several steps to determine the applica-
ble standard of review.98 The following sections focus on
determinations made by the Supreme Court in selecting the
proper standard of review.
1. The Suspect Class
"Traditionally, the principle of equality has been forcefully
stressed in American society. Yet, historically, certain classes
have been continuously prejudiced. In 1938, the Supreme Court
took a stance to rectify this injustice. Realizing that certain
classes deserve special judicial protection, the Court, in United
States v. Carolene Products Co. stated, "prejudice against discrete
and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends se-
riously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordina-
rily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for
a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry."99 In the years
following the Carolene Products decision, the Court has held that
classifications based on national origin,100 race,10 ' and alien-
age,10 2 are "suspect," due to the nature of the interest affected.
98. If a "suspect class" or fundamental right is involved, strict judicial scrutiny
must be utilized. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 184 (1943). See also San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); United
States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). When a constitutional principle is
affected, the intermediate standard of review is applied. See supra note 96. Other
allegations of unconstitutionality are evaluated by the rational basis standard. See
supra note 94.
99. 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
100. See Castenada v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S.
633, 644-46 (1948); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
101. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). See also University of
Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 290-91 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.).
102. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (state restrictions on resi-
dent aliens suspect under the equal protection doctrine and subject to strict judi-
cial scrutiny). Various Supreme Court and lower court decisions following
Graham found other restrictions based on alienage to be unlawful under the
equal protection clause. See Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977) (scholarships
denied due to alienage); Examining Bd. of Eng'rs. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572
(1976) (restrictive requirements in field of civil engineering); In re Griffiths, 413
U.S. 717 (1973) (restrictions in legal profession); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634
(1973) (restrictions in state civil service). Lower courts have also held certain re-
strictions based on alienage unconstitutional. See, e.g., Taggart v. Mandel, 391 F.
Supp. 733 (D. Md. 1975). Cf. Takahasi v. Fish and Game Comm'n., 334 U.S. 410, 420
(1948) ("[tIhe power of a state to apply its laws exclusively to its alien inhabitants
as a class is confined within narrow limits."). But cf. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S.
68 (1979) (upholding New York statute prohibiting employment of aliens as school
teachers); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978) (upholding state statute prohibit-
ing aliens employment as police officers).
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However, the Court has not, and seemingly will not, afford illegal
aliens suspect classification status. In the Plyler decision, the
Court rejected the appellees' claim that illegal aliens are a sus-
pect class.l0 3
The Court, in broadening the categories of groups labeled "sus-
pect," sought to abolish state legislation which imposed disabili-
ties upon certain groups that have been disfavored due to
circumstances beyond their control. Several criteria have been
utilized in classifying a group as suspect.104 Three elements, set
forth in Frontiero v. Richardson, ' 0 5 were: (1) the class must suf-
fer from "an immutable characteristic determined solely by the
accident of birth"; (2) historically, the group must have exper-
ienced degradation and subterfuge; and (3) the group, as a whole,
must lack "effective political power and redress." 0 6 According to
these criteria, the Supreme Court could not justifiably label illegal
aliens as a "suspect class." Since the illegal alien enters the
United States voluntarily, he is not suffering as a result of an acci-
dent of birth.107 Secondly, having no effective political power or
redress, the illegal alien seemingly meets the third requirement
of the criteria suggested to define a suspect class. However,
neither the Constitution nor the federal government afford the il-
legal alien any political rights.108 Thus, the illegal alien is not po-
litically impotent due to historical deprivation or prejudice. The
Supreme Court, upon denying suspect status to illegal aliens, con-
cluded that "[alt the least, those who elect to enter our territory
by stealth and in violation of our law should be prepared to bear
the consequences, including, but not limited to, deportation."o 9
103. 102 S. Ct. at 2396 n.19. "We reject the claim that 'illegal aliens' are a 'sus-
pect class.'" Id.
104. See generally Wilkinson, supra note 45 ("[t he law of suspect classes is
largely one of latent confusion"). The Court has not indicated how many elements
of the Carolene Products and Frontiero criteria must be established to attain sus-
pect class status.
105. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
106. Wilkinson, supra note 45 at 980 (footnote omitted).
107. A convincing argument contends that the illegal aliens who are contesting
§ 21.031 are not here voluntarily. Rather, the minor children, unable to control
their parents' behavior or residence, are compelled to remain involuntarily and il-
legally in the United States. See also infra notes 118-25 and accompanying text.
108. The United States Constitution provides that only citizens of the United
States may hold offices; U.S. CONsT. art. I, §§ 2 & 3; article II, § 1 limits the office of
president to a "natural born Citizen"; while the fifteen, sixteenth, twenty-fourth
and twenty-sixth amendments restrict voting rights to citizens.
109. 102 S. Ct. at 2396.
2. Education: A Fundamental Right?
Any classification that operates to impede or prevent satisfac-
tion of a fundamental interest is presumed to offend the guaran-
tees provided in the equal protection clause. If an interest is
characterized as "fundamental", it must be afforded to all on an
equal basis, unless the state can justify its discriminatory action
by proving its necessity in furthering a compelling state objective.
Therefore, unless a right is given a "fundamental" classification,
legislation which restricts that right will not be analyzed under a
strict scrutiny standard of review.
Education, although recognized as an important interest,"0 has
never been deemed a "fundamental right.""' In San Antonio In-
dependent School District v. Rodriguez the Court stated,
"[e] ducation ... is not among the rights afforded explicit protec-
tion under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for
saying it is implicitly so protected."" 2 The Court, persuaded by
well established precedent, again recognized education as an ex-
tremely vital interest but failed to confer upon it the "fundamen-
tal" status necessary to allow the Court strict scrutiny in its
110. The importance of education in our society is well established. Justice
Marshall stated, in San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973),
[w]hatever the severity of the impact of insufficient food or inadequate
housing on a person's life, they have never been considered to bear the
same direct and immediate relationship to constitutional concerns for free
speech and for our political processes as education has long been recog-
nized to bear. Perhaps the best evidence of this fact is the unique status
which has been accorded public education as the single public service
nearly unanimously guaranteed in the Constitutions of our States. Educa-
tion, in terms of constitutional values, is much more analogous, in my
judgment, to the right to vote in state elections than to public welfare or,
public housing. Indeed, it is not without significance that we have long
recognized education as an essential step in providing the disadvantaged
with the tools necessary to achieve economic self-sufficiency.
Id. at 115 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
In Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) the Court recognized education as a
vital interest. The Court explained:
[cihildren who have been thus educationally and culturally set apart
from the larger community will inevitably acquire habits of speech, con-
duct, and attitudes reflecting their cultural isolation. They are likely to ac-
quire speech habits, for example, which vary from the environment in
which they must ultimately function and compete, if they are to enter and
be a part of that community. This is not peculiar to race; in this setting, it
can affect any children who, as a group, are isolated by force of law from
the mainstream.
Id. at 287.
In Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) it %as stated that, "[tIoday, edu-
cation is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments." Id.
at 493. And further, "[s]uch an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to
provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms." Id.
111. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (ed-
ucation not a fundamental right).
112. Id. at 35.
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review of section 21.031.113
3. An Intermediate Standard of Review
Refusal to define illegal aliens as a suspect class and reluctance
to classify education as a fundamental right, consequently, pro-
hibits the utilization of the strict judicial scrutiny standard as the
requisite level of review. Yet, the Court also refused to apply the
rational basis standard of review. Reasoning that section 21.031
places a severe discriminatory burden on minor children who are
unable to control their illegal status, the Court sought a higher
level of review, because the statute denied those children the ex-
tremely important benefits of the institution of education." 4 The
Court, therefore, chose an intermediate standard of review to be
used in its analysis of the Texas statute." 5
Although the Court does not categorize illegal aliens as a sus-
pect class, the Court does afford this particular group of children
a special status." 6 This special classification has been referred to
as "sensitive" rather than "suspect."" 7 The Texas statute classi-
fies a select group of minor children and "imposes its discrimina-
tory burden on the basis of a legal char- acteristic over which
children can have little control."" 8 In essence, section 21.031 pe-
nalizes children for the acts of their parents." 9 Thus, the "legal
burden" does not "bear some relationship to [the] individual re-
sponsibility or wrongdoing."' 20 However, this type of classification
113. 102 S. Ct. at 2398. "Nor is education a fundamental right .... " Id.
114. Id. at 2396-97.
115. Much criticism has been directed at the recently devised intermediate
standard of review. Chief Justice Burger, in the dissenting opinion of Plyler, notes
that, although the Court refuses to use the strict scrutiny standard of review, the
Court "spins out a theory custom-tailored to the facts" by "patching together bits
and pieces of what might be termed quasi-suspect-class and quasi-fundamental-
rights analysis." Id. at 2409 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See generally Gunther,
supra note 94, at 17-20.
116. 102 S. Ct. at 2396. "The children who are plaintiffs in these cases are spe-
cial members of this underclass." Id. See also supra note 109.
117. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrrUTIoNAL LAW at 1090 (1978) (rec-
ognizing that gender and illegitimacy are "sensitive" and not "suspect" classes).
118. 102 S. Ct. at 2397.
119. The Supreme Court has previously recognized that it is unfair' to stigma-
tize children who are not responsible for their birth. These illegal alien children
have no control over their Mexican nationality, their place of residence, or their
parents' violation of immigration laws. See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (af-
forded illegitimate child "sensitive" class status); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762
(1977) (children cannot affect their parents' conduct).
120. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972). The Court contin-
tends to support the view that the equal protection clause is an
"equalizer," designed to abolish every handicap afflicting persons
not directly responsible for the hardship.121 Critics of this special
categorization rely on persuasive precedent maintaining that the
equal protection clause does not require identical treatment of all
individuals. 22 Congress also has refused to treat all individuals
in an equal manner. 2 3
Had the Court relied solely on its classification of illegal alien
children as a "sensitive" class to justify an intermediate level of
review, conceivably the rationale would have been subject to mer-
itorious attack. 24 However, given the importance of the interest
involved, the Court correctly analyzed section 21.031 according to
an "equality of opportunity" theory. 25 Justice Marshall, in his
dissenting opinion in Dandridge v. Williams, supported a sliding-
scale or intermediate level of review approach:
In my view, equal protection analysis of this case is not appreciably ad-
vanced by the a priori definition of a "right," fundamental or otherwise.
Rather, concentration must be placed upon the character of the classifica-
tion in question, the relative importance to individuals in the class dis-
criminated against of the governmental benefits that they do not receive,
and the asserted state interests in support of the classification. 12 6
Justice Marshall further distinguished the importance of equal-
ued: "[v]isiting... condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and unjust.
Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the. . . child is an
ineffectual - as well as unjust - way of deterring the parent." Id. (footnote omit-
ted) (emphasis added).
121. 102 S. Ct. at 2396.
122. See Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971); Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141 (1940).
123. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976). Several nonconstitutional benefits
are denied undocumented aliens because of their illegal status. See 7 U.S.C.
§ 2015(f) (Supp. 1981) (excluding illegal aliens from participation in the food
stamp program); 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a) (1) (B) (1974) (excluding illegal aliens from
supplemental security income for aged, blind, and disabled); Aid to Families with
Dependent Children, 45 C.F.R. § 233.50 (1979) (excluding illegal aliens); Medicaid,
42 C.F.R. § 435.402 (1981) (excluding illegal aliens). See also 5 C.F.R. § 7.4 (1982)
(excluding aliens from most federal jobs by making them ineligible to take civil
service exam).
124. But the need for great caution in such intervention is apparent. The
relationship that efforts to redress relative economic disadvantage bear to
the process of personal self-realization, whether in an educational, career,
or any other sense, is often a subtle and unfathomable one. Welfare bene-
fits, for example, may in certain instances spark individual incentives but
in other instances depress it .... Furthermore . . . no judicial attempt to
redress economic inequality can be launched without serious intrusion
upon the fundamental mission of the legislative branch to collect and dis-
burse public funds. Vindication of important opportunity rights, however,
often can and should be accomplished short of direct interference with so
important a political prerogative.
Wilkinson, supra note 45, at 986-87 n.208 (emphasis added).
125. See generally Wilkinson, supra note 45, at 976-998 (analysis of judiciary's
role in equality of opportunity).
126. 397 U.S. 471, 520-21 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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ity of opportunity with regard to education as opposed to the
equality of opportunity in receiving benefits such as public wel-
fare and housing.127 He equated the close relationship of educa-
tion with highly regarded constitutional values. 128 A high level of
importance concerning the institution of education was also es-
poused by Chief Justice Burger in the dissenting opinion of Plyler
v. Doe, where he stated, "[tihe importance of education is beyond
dispute."129 However, upon concluding that education is not a
fundamental right, Chief Justice Burger criticizes the court for la-
beling it as such.130 This criticism is unfounded. 13 1 The Supreme
Court never classified education as a fundamental right. Educa-
tion is afforded status as an extremely important interest, an in-
terest that "has a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of
our society."'132 Combining education as a "special" interest with
the classification of undocumented alien children as a "sensitive"
class, the Court is able to justify its choice of an intermediate
standard of review in its analysis of section 21.031.133
4. The "Substantiality" of the State's Asserted Goals
In applying an intermediate standard of review, the challenged
statute must be analyzed to determine if it furthers a substantial
127. See, e.g., supra note 41.
128. 411 U.S. at 109, 110, 116 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
I believe that the close nexus between education and our established con-
stitutional values with respect to freedom of speech and participation in
the political process makes this a different case from our prior decisions
concerning discrimination affecting public welfare, [citations omitted] or
housing. There can be no question that, as the majority suggests, consti-
tutional rights may be less meaningful for someone without enough to eat
or without decent housing. But the crucial difference lies in the closeness
of the relationship.
Id. at 115 n.74.
129. 102 S. Ct. at 2411 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
130. Id. While the majority does not classify education as a fundamental right,
they seemingly afford it fundamental right status. Chief Justice Burger criticizes
this use of the intermediate scrutiny. "Yet we have held repeatedly that the im-
portance of a governmental service does not elevate it to the status of a "funda-
mental right" for purposes of equal protection analysis." Id.
131. "Public education is not a 'right' granted to individuals by the Constitu-
tion." 102 S. Ct. at 2397.
132. Id.
133. In determining the rationality of § 21.031, wE. may appropriately take
into account its costs to the Nation and to the innocent children who are
its victims. In light of these countervailing costs, the discrimination con-
tained in § 21.031 can hardly be considered rational unless it furthers some
substantial goal of the State.
Id. at 2398.
state interest. A statute may be analyzed for "substantiality" by a
dual inquiry: 1) what legitimate interest does the state seek to
promote; and 2) what fundamental personal interests are being
endangered by the state's action? In carrying out these inquiries,
a court must examine several elements: 1) the status of the group
affected; 2) the importance of the interest denied or burdened;
and 3) the validity and significance of the state interest to be
served.
Texas, via section 21.031, seeks to enhance state revenues by de-
nying certain children a tuition-free education.134 In addition, it is
argued that savings resulting from enforcement of section 21.031
will improve the quality of education for those children legiti-
mately deserving the state benefit.135 The appellants, in further
support of section 21.031, claim that undocumented children are
properly denied the benefit of education because of their illegal
status in the United States, and therefore, the statute is in compli-
ance with established congressional policy.136 While the majority
in Plyler never offers a definitive statement as to whether a reduc-
tion in state expenditures is a legitimate state goal, the minority
does address the issue, stating, "[y]et I assume no member of
this Court would argue that prudent conservation of finite state
revenues is per se an illegitimate goal."' 37 Concededly, a reduc-
tion in state expenditures may well be viewed as a legitimate
state interest, however, the dissenting Justices failed to examine
this determination in light of the harsh result of section 21.031.138
Furthermore, the State produced no evidence in support of the
contention that the exclusion of a certain class of children would
improve the overall quality of education in Texas.139 Secondly, the
Court found the state's argument citing congressional policy in
support of section 21.031 to be without merit. Traditionally, the ju-
diciary has declined to interfere with areas reserved for Con-
gress.140 However, noting the importance of the interest at stake,
134. But see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969) (dictum) (arbitrarily
denying admission to certain students, in an effort to reduce education expendi-
tures, is unconstitutional).
135. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
136. 102 S. Ct. at 2398-99.
137. Id. at 2412 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
138. Chief Justice Burger concludes that a state may "reasonably, and constitu-
tionally, elect not to provide [illegal aliens] with governmental services at the ex-
pense of those who are lawfully in the State." 102 S. Ct. at 2412 (footnote
ommitted). However, Chief Justice Burger reaches this conclusion with respect to
"governmental services," whereas education was afforded higher status than that
of benefit or service. Id. at 2411 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
139. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. See also 501 F. Supp. at 583
(savings from amount of money spent on each child will not greatly affect the
quality of education).
140. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976).
[Vol. 10: 139, 1982] Plyler v. Doe
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
the Court states, "this traditional caution does not persuade us
that unusual deference must be shown the classification embod-
ied in § 21.031."141 Texas also contends that section 21.031 is har-
monious with congressional policy because it is aimed at
curtailing illegal migration into Texas, and further, that a state is
afforded the opportunity to act with respect to illegal aliens so
long as such action is in concert with federal policy. The
Supreme Court, however, found no congressional policy support-
ing the denial of education to illegal alien children and also noted
that the appellants failed to establish that section 21.031 acted as
a successful tool in discouraging the immigration of illegal
aliens.142 Thus, the stated goals were not of substantial character
when compared with the interest endangered by the operation of
section 21.031.143 This conclusion, even though "noble and com-
passionate,"'44 is the only result that could have logically followed
from the standard of review imposed by the Supreme Court.
V. FUTURE IMPACT
Overall, the Plyler decision may have a detrimental effect on
the strength of the democratic system. Rendering a favorable de-
cision in an area previously exempt from judicial review, the
Supreme Court has received criticism in the aftermath of its deci-
sion invalidating section 21.031 as unconstitutional. It is conceiva-
ble that the Court has overstepped its boundaries as the
dissenting Justices accuse.145 Arguably however, the extreme im-
portance of the subject matter must be noted. Even the Court's
staunch critics acknowledge the consequential long-term benefits
which will result from the decision.146
141. 102 S. Ct. at 2399.
142. Id. at 2398-99. See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976) (giving states the
power to act concerning illegal aliens provided those acts are in keeping with es-
tablished federal objectives).
143. 102 S. Ct. at 2402.
144. Id. at 2408.
145. "Today's cases, I regret to say, present yet another example of unwar-
ranted judicial action which in the long run tends to contribute to the weakening
of our political processes." Id. at 2414 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (footnote omitted)
(emphasis added). See also supra note 126.
146. Id. at 2413-14 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger conceded,
"[djenying a free education to illegal alien children is not a choice I would make
were I a legislator. Apart from compassionate considerations, the long-range costs
of excluding any children from the public schools may well out-weigh the costs of
educating them." Id.
The most crucial aspect of the Plyler decision was the selection
of the standard of review to be used in analyzing the statute for
constitutional validity. Had the Court chosen a rational basis
standard, illegal alien children may well have been legally denied
free public education. The refusal of the dissent to refute the
standard of review chosen was the point at which they failed to
justify section 21.031 under the Constitution. Basic constitutional
arguments proposed by the dissent, however compelling, do not
effectively address the situation as presented by the majority of
the Court. It appears that this intermediate level of review will be
frequently utilized by the Court in future cases which deal with
emotional issues, issues governed by the canons of humanity
rather than rigid legalities. It is with this tool, the flexible inter-
mediate level of review, that the Court will set new trends in the
law.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is hard to conceive of any one institution that is more impor-
tant in every aspect than the institution of education. Yet, also of
extreme importance are the fundamental constitutional principles
regarding the separation of the three branches of the American
government. The tremendous task facing the Supreme Court in
the Plyler case was that of striking a balance between the two vi-
tal interests.
Education has, historically, been accorded an extremely high
level of importance. The Court's previous policy of allowing
states wide latitude in educational practices and procedures has
not necessarily come to an end.147 The Court has interfered in a
very limited manner and then, only in order to protect an ex-
tremely important interest. Justice Marshall, in his dissent in
Rodriguez stated that, "[tihe majority's holding can only be seen
as a retreat from our historic commitment to equality of educa-
tional opportunity .... In my judgment, the right. . .to an equal
start in life... is far too vital to permit state discrimination."148
The "historic commitment" of which Justice Marshall speaks,
may refute the critics' allegation that the Supreme Court has, by
overstepping its boundaries, intruded upon an area previously un-
touched. In taking this controversial stance, the Supreme Court
will eventually be given credit for its crucial part in preserving
147. Courts, specifically federal courts, have been reluctant to infringe upon ed-
ucational practices of the states. See generally Hamilton, School Order Brings In-
equity, Washington Post, Feb. 9, 1975, at Al, col. 6 (discussing court interference
with school system).
148. 411 U.S. 1, 70-71 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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equality of opportunity, a principle inherent in our Constitu-
tion.149 The Court has succeeded in "shift[ing] our focus from
special and competing categories of children, to concentra[tion]
on articulating a standard of basic education for all children."150
"[I]mposing [a] societal obligation to provide a minimally satis-
factory life"151 can hardly be seriously criticized. The Court's de-
cision seeks to afford to all, whether citizen, legal alien, or illegal
alien, an equal opportunity to achieve social, emotional, and eco-
nomic stability.
DIANE I. OSIFCHOK
149. In Shelton v. Tucker, the Court stated, "[t]he vigilant protection of consti-
tutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American
schools." 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960). Years later, the Court again acknowledged the
vast importance of education. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Abing-
ton School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
150. Levin, supra note 95 at 263 (emphasis original).
151. Id.

